The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of Interpretation :: Gadamer Philosophy Philosophical Essays

The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of InterpretationABSTRACT This news report reexamines the central thesis of Gadamers theory of interpretation that preyness is non a suitable ideal for netherstanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to slang clear the crusade for this claim, I consider three possible disceptations. The first, overabundant in the secondary literature, is build on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I rule out this argument as insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I challenge to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections (i) that it conflates meaning and signific ance and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism. Gadamers theory of philosophical hermeneutics amounts to a continue argument for a mountain that one might call anti-objectivism or interpretive pluralism. (1) This view holds that in understanding a text, historical event, cultural phenomenon or perhaps anything at all, objectivity is not a suitable ideal because there does not exist any one correct interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. In Gadamers words, understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well (G 280 E 296) it is a fusion of horizons of the past and present, objective and subjective (G 289 E 306). At the same time, Gadamer wants to steer clear of an anything-goes relativism. In other words, in Gadamers view, understanding is a bear on that invites and even demands a face pack of interpretations, but not at the expense of giving up criteria that distinguish right ones from wrong ones. What exactly are Ga damers grounds for denying the existence of a unequivocally correct interpretation of a text, object, or event? I begin by showing the inadequacy of two arguments for his position. I then turn to a third more promising argument that objectivity is not possible because the object of understanding is not determinate, but preferably constituted anew by each act of understanding. My goal in this paper is to provide a fuller justification for the third argument and thereby defend Gadamers position. I do so by reformulating this third argument in terms of relational properties so as to establish that the knowers situatedness plays, as Gadamer himself insists, a positive, constitutive role in the process of understanding.The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of Interpretation Gadamer Philosophy Philosophical EssaysThe Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of InterpretationABSTRACT This paper reexamines the central thesis of Gadamers theory of interpretation that objectivi ty is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections (i) that it conflates meaning and significance and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism. Gadamers theory of philosophical hermeneutics amounts to a sustained argument for a view that one might call anti-objectivi sm or interpretive pluralism. (1) This view holds that in understanding a text, historical event, cultural phenomenon or perhaps anything at all, objectivity is not a suitable ideal because there does not exist any one correct interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. In Gadamers words, understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well (G 280 E 296) it is a fusion of horizons of the past and present, objective and subjective (G 289 E 306). At the same time, Gadamer wants to steer clear of an anything-goes relativism. In other words, in Gadamers view, understanding is a process that invites and even demands a plurality of interpretations, but not at the expense of giving up criteria that distinguish right ones from wrong ones. What exactly are Gadamers grounds for denying the existence of a uniquely correct interpretation of a text, object, or event? I begin by showing the inadequacy of two arguments for his position. I then turn to a thi rd more promising argument that objectivity is not possible because the object of understanding is not determinate, but rather constituted anew by each act of understanding. My goal in this paper is to provide a fuller justification for the third argument and thereby defend Gadamers position. I do so by reformulating this third argument in terms of relational properties so as to establish that the knowers situatedness plays, as Gadamer himself insists, a positive, constitutive role in the process of understanding.